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Freedom of the Will 
Allen C Guelzo 
THE EXACT NATURE of the human will is, like the nature of human con-
sciousness, a question so subjective and so interior that no one is ever 
likely to arrive at a satisfactory judgment about how it functions or even 
what it is-which may be the best proof that philosophy is not a science, 
and the best evidence that those social sciences which try to measure, 
quantify, and control aspects of humap consciousness are not sciences ei-
ther. Still, there is no denying that we are aware of a power or an impulse 
within us which transJates thought into action, or at least responds ·to 
perceptions of threat or opportunity. So even if we have difficulty in 
defining the will, most of us can acknowledge that there is something like 
that at work as part of human consciousness. 
What may be easier than defining this will is ascertaining whether it is 
free. At the same time that we are conscious of possessing a will, we are 
also conscious that this power, except in cases of mental illness, is not ran-
dom. It is, after all, our will that we subjectively sense at work. So we might 
be able to say that, simply by virtue of its being a process that origi-
nates within ourselves, willing is free-free from external constraint, free 
because it belongs to us and not to someone else, free because nothing we 
sense subjectively seems to intervene between a desire for something and 
our reaching outward to satisfy that desire. Unless, of course, another de-
sire intervenes-at which point we immediately realize that the transition 
from desiring to willing is not quite so simple as we thought. And as soon 
as we have recognized that, we are likely to acknowledge the operatipn of 
our wills is affected by our habits, our temperament, and our exteriQr cir-
cumstances. We might desire A, only to find out that B is equally attractive: 
which desire does the will obey? If the will "obeys" desires, is it still free? 
If it does not, it might be free, but then it will be unpredictable-something 
which the bulk of experience testifies against-or perhaps influenced by 
factors outside our consciousness, in which case our will seems hardly to 
belong to us anymore and can't be considered free after all. At this mo-
ment, we will recollect that we never actually defined what we meant by 
free, either, so that we are unsure, not only of how the will is working, but 
of what we mean by a free will. But unsure or not, we cannot avoid these 
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problems, because knowing whether the will is free is involved in a series 
of practical and unavoidable questions: 
How do we hold people accountable for their actions if their wills are 
not free? 
How can people be considered politically free within a polity if they do 
not possess freedom of will? 
How is it possible to understand the relationship of cause and effect if 
the human will has the power to rise above causality and act freely? (And 
if it cannot . .. return to the first question). 
How can there be a God (or at least a God worthy of the name) unless 
he controls a/] events? But if he does, how can human choices be free? If 
he only controls some events, does he really control any? In either case, 
what incentive is there for obedience, prayers, petitions, and worship? 
If a God does not control all events, who (or what) does? If there is no 
such control, are all events (including the operation of the human will) 
random? If they are, what's the po~nt of doing anything at all? 
Jonathan Edwards turned to the problem of the will in the 1740s with 
many of these questions in mind. Behind him was a long tradition of 
scholastic reasoning on the subject which he read as an undergraduate at 
Yale, plus the legacy of the Calvinist theology which had entered like iron 
into his soul. Around him was a bewildering new world of philosophical 
inquiry, defined by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century 
and its Enlightenment popularizers, that opened up entirely new and un-
comfortable trains of reasoning both for and against free will. Liberty 
was the byword of the Enlightenment-liberty from the shackles of the 
scholastic past, liberty from the dominance of theology, liberty from in-
herited, unearned, and unnatural status-and free will would become its 
moral corollary. Edwards would not be the only Calvinist, or theologian, 
or moralist, or American, to take on the subject, but he would become 
the most famous to challenge the inroads of a fashionable free-willism 
in the New England churches he loved and served. He would devote his 
single most sustained piece of·philosophical and theological inquiry to it 
in Freedom of the Will ( 17 54), where he would bend his energies to two 
tasks: uhdermining the notion that the human will possesses some sort of 
unique autonomy, or "self-determination," and showing that a universe 
in which all events have been determined by God is not inconsistent with 
human liberty or moral accountability. 
It is hard to date exactly when questions about free will emerged as an 
independent discussion of their own. Both Plato and Aristotle were aware 
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that the movement from thinking to doing was neither direct nor simple (as 
in the so-called Medean paradox: I see the good but do the evil), and Aris-
totle in particular was conscious of the logical irreconcilability of an action 
and its possible alternatives. (There will either be a naval battle or there 
will not be a naval battle today, Aristotle pointed out; it can't be both, so it 
is necessary that there be either one or the other). Similarly, thinkers as far 
removed as the unnamed Hebrew author of Job, and the Roman Stoic 
Seneca understood that the power of divine providence posed a genuine 
difficulty to all who supposed that their actions originated solely in his own 
will. But the idea that the will was a sort of separate power, or faculty, of 
its own within the human psyche, and that it might possess a role (and a 
freedom) in human decision making quite apart from the other faculties, 
really originates with the Christian Augustine. "I knew I had a will [volun-
tas] as surely as I knew I had life in me," Augustine wrote in his autobio-
graphical Confessions, and this voluntas had sufficient power, not only to 
stymy the decisions of the intellect, but to carry the person in an entirely 
different direction. "I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon me by an-
other, but by my own will, which had the strength of iron chains." 1 This t;e-
alization accomplished two things: first, it identified love with the will, and 
made the synthesis of loving/willing/desiring the superior of simple reason; 
second, it encouraged submission to a completely sovereign God. This not 
only discovered order in human experience by referring it to a totalizing 
providential plan but also ended the sense of ennui and purposelessness 
which pervades the atmosphere of late antiquity in the West (something 
which showed up in spades in Augustine's great paean to God's direction 
and control over human history, the Civitatis Dei). 
No one in western Christendom could entirely tear loose from the over-
whelming influence of Augustine's insistence on God's ultimate control of 
human events. In fact, to suggest otherwise was to associate oneself with 
pagan unbelievers like Lucretius, whose doctrine of the spontaneous and 
uncaused "swerve" of matter seemed to put chance on the throne of the 
universe. Not even the Protestant Reformation challenged the consensus 
in western Christianity about divine sovereignty. John Calvin, who shared 
Augustine's healthy respect for the power of the will and the undepend-
ability of the intellect, also insisted that "the will of God is the cause of all 
things that happen in the world." As for the evil that is done in the world, 
"these very things are the right and just works of God. "2 Attempts by · 
Protestants to step out from under the shadow of God's predestination, 
which the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius proposed in the early 
1600s, were promptly and systematically slapped down by confessional-
ists and Puritans alike as a kind of theologicallese-majeste. 
But even as Arminius was receiving his comeuppance at the Synod of 
Dordt in 1619, a revolution in European thought was already swelling 
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toward an eruption. The new scientific method proposed by Francis 
Bacon, and the new scientific discoveries 'of Galileo and Newton, com-
pletely. rewrote the idea of providence by substituting for the intelligent 
design of God the soulless and mechanical activity of physics. For the first 
time in the West, unbelief rather then devotion became identified with the 
denial of free will, and the activity of the will became merely the last act 
in a rigid chain of physical causes. "Voluntary actions," wrote Thomas 
Hobbes, "have all of them necessary causes, and are therefore necessi-
tated," but by material substances, not God.3 
This set off an unseemly panic among the theologians, who regrouped 
throughout the eighteenth century around a defense of free will, reason-
ing that if people really do possess a power of choosing freely, then not 
everything is controlled by material cause-and-effect, and some room is 
left in the universe for genuine and responsible activity by both God and 
his creatures. Jonathan Edwards, who had graduated from Yale in 1720, 
hoped that Puritan New England would be spared the plague of "Armini-
anism." He knew from his own youthful· experience what it was like to 
be "full of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty," and he 
also knew what it was like, once he had been genuinely converted, to re-
ceive "quite another kind of sense of God's sovereignty than I had then," 
so that it became "my delight to approach God, and adore him as a Sov-
ereign God, and ask sovereign mercy of him" (16:791-92, 799). 
But the blandishments of the new Arminianism crept in under the barred 
gate even of New England Puritanism. Unsettled New England divines like 
Boston's Charles Chauncy concluded that "Men ... can't be religious but 
with the free Consent of their Wills; and this dm be gain'd in no Way but 
that of Reason and Persuasion:"4 Edwards had just betome pastor of a 
small congregation in New York when Yale was rocked by the "Great 
Apostasy"-the defection of seven of the Yale staff, including the rector, to 
the Church of England and the new "Arminianism." In May 1724, Ed-
wards was recalled to Yale as a tutor to fill the vacuum caused by the 
"Arminian" scandal. But the "Arminian" influence proved exceedingly 
difficult to root out. Edwards' health broke under the strain, and it must 
have been with great relief that he received the call of the church in 
Northampton, Massachusetts (where his grandfather Solomon Stoddard 
was the senior pastor), to become the pastoral assistant in 1727, and then, 
after Stoddard's death, in 1729, called again as senior pastor. 
For the next twenty years, all explicit discussion of "Arminianism" dis-
appears from Edwards' writings, but he remained vigilant against the 
possibility of its appearance. In the fall of 1734, a "great noise" went up 
in western Massachusetts "about Arminianism, which seemed to appear 
with a very threatening aspect upon the interest of religion here" (3:148, 
FREEDOM OF THE WILL 119 
16:50). The pastor of the church at Sunderland, William Rand, had been 
rumored to be preaching "new notions as to the doctrine of justifica-
tion," and Robert Breck, the new pastor of the church in Springfield, 
was hailed before the regional ministerial association on suspicion of 
"Arminianism." But Edwards' response as pastor in Northampton was 
to begin preaching, not on predestination, but on justification. The re-
sults were two remarkable rekindlings of religious fervor in Northamp-
ton and western Massachusetts, first in 1734-35 and then again in the 
wake of the New England tour of the intinerant Anglican maverick, 
George Whitefield, in 17 40-41. Edwards seized on these revivals as good 
reasons "for Arminians to change their principles" and "relinquish their 
scheme," since so much of the testimony of the spiritually awakened in 
Northampton had rounded on "the doctrine of God's absolute sover-
eignty with regard to the salvation of sinners" (3:168, 503). But in the 
public letter he wrote about the revivals for Thomas Prince's Christian 
History in 1743 (3:544-57), it was the "very lamentable decay of reli-
gious affections" and not Arminianism which was Edwards' principal 
concern to oppose. 
It was only after the revivals had cooled and Edwards became em-
broiled in controversy with his own congregation over the terms of ad-
mission to communion that his attention began to turn to the project of 
writing a book against the Arminians. He had been "engaged in studies 
on the Arminian controversies and preparing to write something upon 
them" as early as 1747, and as he told the Scots Presbyterian John Er-
skine in 1752, his intention from the first was "to write something 
upon ... free will and moral agency" (16:491). Just how far his thinking 
had gone appears in January 1750, when Edwards, having received a 
question about free will from his former pupil Joseph Bellamy, wrote a 
reply which contains the core of the argument he would later put into 
fuller form in 1754 (16:318, 491). 
The communion controversy, which ended in Edwards' dismissal 
from Northampton in 1750, interrupted this "design of writing against 
Arminianism." It also convinced Edwards that Arminianism had some-
how been the real issue behind the contention over communion, thus 
adding the fuel of personal humiliation to the fire of doctrinal conflict. 
In his Farewell Sermon, Edwards warned the restless Northamptonites 
that "Arminianism, and doctrines of like tendency" were "creeping into 
almost all parts of the land." 5 In 17 51 he was called as pastor and mis-
sionary to the mixed Indian and white congregation at Stockbridge oper-
ated by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England, 
but he continued to fight the communion battle over his shoulder. In the 
letter to the Northampton church that he appended to Misrepresentations 
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Corrected and Truth Vindicated in 1752, Edwards declared that "it was 
evident, that Arminianism, and other loose notions in religion" had 
begu.l\ ''.to get some footing among you" (16:484). He told the Scots Pres-
byterian John Erskine just after the dismissal that he had discovered the 
leaders of the movement against him "falling in In some essential things 
with Arminians," while "four or five" of the ministerial council called to 
approve the dismissal "have heretofore had the reputation of Arminians" 
(16:353, 312). 
There is, consequently, nothing surprising in finding that Edwards 
had no sooner completed the elaborate self-defense of his position on com-
munion in Misrepresentations Corrected than he was once more a~; work 
"writing something on the Arminian controversy," especially on "the 
nature of that freedom of moral agents, which makes them the proper 
subjects of moral government, moral precepts, counsels, calls, motives, 
persuasions, promises and threatenings, praise and blame, rewards and 
punishments ... endeavoring also to bring the late, great objections and 
outcries against the Calvinistic divinity, from these topics, to the test of 
the strictest reasoning" (16:491). He must have worked with tremendous 
speed and concentration, since the first draft was "almost finished" in 
only seven months, and in mid-April1753, he forwarded "proposals for 
printing by subscription something I· have been writing" to Thomas Fox-
croft, a ministerial colleague in Boston who had agreed to act as his go-
between with the printer, Samuel Kneeland (16:593-94). 
His patience was short. All during the summer and winter of 1753, Ed-
wards had to cope with bouts of illness and political in-fighting while 
managing the Stockbridge mission. He insisted to Foxcroft that the man-
uscript be printed "in the best character" Kneeland possessed, and when 
Foxcroft failed to keep him updated about the manuscript's prospects, 
Edwards wrote querulously to him, wanting "to know very much what is 
become of it" (16:619). In March 1754, Foxcroft finally sent a descrip-
tion of the printing for Edwards to approve. But Edwards disliked "such 
a small page as you mention, less than a psalter." He wanted "good white 
paper and the printer's best types," and he could not resist sending Fox-
croft a last-minute insertion and a correction (16:625). 
The book was finally published in October 17 54, under the title A 
Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that 
Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, 
Vertue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. (For prac-
tical purposes, it would thereafter be known simply as Freedom of the 
Will, or more simply as "Edwards on the Will"). Once the finished vol-
ume was in hand, Edwards was still unhappy with it. He composed a list 
of errata for Kneeland and informed Foxcroft that Kneeland "binds the 
books poorly. The covers are so apt to warp that they will warp as they 
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lie upon the table" (16:655). Of the 298 subscribers (including book-
sellers) who paid to receive copies of Freedom of the Will, only seven 
were from Northampton. 
Edwards was not interested in writing a comprehensive, dispassionate sur-
vey of the entire problem of free will. What he really wanted to do was 
much more specific, and that was to destroy Arminianism as a viable op-
tion and justify Calvinistic theism as the only way to understand the sov-
ereignty of God. Both the critique of Arminianism and the model he offers 
for understanding the justice of Calvinism are philosophically ingenious-
his destruction of Arminianism is just as destructive when applied to al-
most any other version of libertarianism-and he certainly believed that 
he was dealing with a question which went straight to the root of larger 
problems in human self-identity and self-understanding. "The knowledge 
of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two 
chief faculties of our nature, the understanding and will," Edwards wrote 
in the preface to Freedom of the Will (1:133). But his task in Freedom of 
the Will is primarily apologetic and ethical rather than philosophical. He 
wants people not to have a satisfying romp through the garden of ideas 
but to become Calvinists. 
The book divides into four "parts" and a conclusion. From the very 
opening of the first "part," Edwards moves at once to seize the high 
ground by offering a definition of the will which, if accepted by the unwary 
reader, will function like the hook in a fish's mouth. "The will (without 
any metaphysical refining) is plainly, that by which the mind chooses any-
thing"; the will is, in fact, "the same as an act of choosing or choice" 
(1:137). In other words, Edwards describes the will as something which 
is analytically identical with the mental action of choosing, so that the 
will does not exist as a separate mental department, capable of checking, 
resisting, or amending what the intellect settles upon as its choice. "In 
every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the 
mind, or inclination, one way rather than another" (1:140). Detach the 
will from those "preponderations," and you would get absolutely noth-
ing, rather than independent action. Where there is no choosing in the in-
tellect, there is no willing. 
This shifts the real attention away from the will itself and onto the in-
timate connection of the intellect and the will. As Edwards puts it, let a 
motive appeal in any sort of way to the intellect, so that the motive ap-
pears as "the greatest apparent good" at that moment, and the will must 
move into action at once to apprehend that "good."6 Hence, Edwards 
can say that any "motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is 
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the strongest, that determines the will" ( 1:140). Or, to put it more starkly, 
one may as well say "that the will always is as the greatest apparent good 
is" (1:142). The will, for Edwards, looks more like a highly fluid process 
than a stand-alone faculty, less like a review board and more like the ter-
minal point of an electric current in which a motive triggers the assent of 
the intellect, and the will shifts into play. And his use of the term motive 
makes it clear that what the mind saw as "good" was not always the 
product of logic, reason, or deliberation. 
This definition of the will gives it so little room for action that one 
might justifiably complain that Edwards has made willing necessary-
which was the trump card Arminians in particular and free-willers in gen-
eral liked to play, since necessity conjured up in the eighteenth-century 
mind images of orreries, mechanical animals, and other machines, forcing 
and grinding their helpless components into soulless patterns of activity. 
That, Edwards admitted, was indeed one way of using the word, and im-
plies "some supposed opposition made to the existence of the, thing spo-
ken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it" (1:149). 
Transferred to his definition of the will, it would make matters look as if 
his motives dragged the kicking and screaming will into conformity with 
their demands. But that was not the only possible meaning of necessity, 
Edwards pointed out. There is such a thing as natural necessity, where 
people are compelled to will contrary to their intellect; but there is also a 
philosophical necessity, which "is really nothing else than the full and 
fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate 
of a proposition, which affirms something to be true" (1:152). This is the 
kind of connection which is expressed, for instance, by a geometric theo-
rem, or the description of a historical fact, or anything that enjoys "a con-
nection with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something 
that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other cer-
tainly follows" (1:153-54). In this version of necessity, there is no kicking, 
no screaming, no felt sense of force, but rather the logical and harmonious 
process of moving from one logically connected proposition to another. 
What Edwards is waiting to introduce is a subset of philosophical 
necessity that he designates moral necessity, and that describes the same 
sense of unresisting "connection and consequence," only this time arising 
"from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, of motives, and 
the connection which there is in many cases between these, and such cer-
tain volitions and actions" (1:156). So, while we can deplore the intrusion 
of natural necessity into the operation of the will with the same energy as 
the Arminians, we can also insist on the perfect legitimacy of moral ne-
cessity, because moral necessity never involves "some supposable volun-
tary opposition or endeavor" (1:159). In fact, we can deploy the same 
distinction, not just between kinds of necessity, but between kinds of 
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necessity's opposite, which is ability. We possess natural ability when we 
have the literal physical ability to carry out our volitions; moral ability 
describes the possession of the moral wherewithal to carry them out, 
since one might be in full possession of all the natural ability to perform 
an action but lack the moral ability, due to the power of depraved habits 
and inclinations, to raise a finger. "A woman of great honor and chastity 
may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave," Edwards 
offered by way of example, while "a moral inability to love wickedness 
in general, may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked per-
sons or things" (1:160). Although both situations employed the Armin-
ian bogey-words necessity and inability, in neither case was anyone being 
forced, or deprived of freedom of action. 
As Edwards closed the first "part" of Freedom of the Will, he had ma-
neuvered the terminology in such a way as to disarm the Arminians even 
before the battle was joined. The will was not an independent faculty 
which possessed a liberty of its own ("That which has the power of voli-
tion or choice is the man or the soul, not the power for volition itself" 
[1:163]). And freedom for the will meant, not the power of the will to 
choose for itself, but "that power and opportunity for one to do and con-
duct as he will, or according to his choice." It mattered nothing to Ed-
wards how the whole process was started-including if it originated in 
divine decree. If there was natural ability available, "and nothing in the 
way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will," then he was as per-
fectly free as anyone could desire (1:164). 
It was now time, in the second "part," for Edwards to turn the weapons 
he had seized on the epistemologically confused Arminians, and to that 
end he began knocking over one Arminian objection to divine predestina-
tion after another. Did the Arminians believe that the will is an indepen-
dent faculty which forms its own volitions? If this will decides on Z, then 
there had to be a prior act of will in the will to make that decision wliich 
we may call Y. But the same process by which Y called Z into action was 
also required to get Y moving as well, thus requiring yet another act of 
will, which we may call X, to causeY; and thus to infinite regress. Or if 
infinite regress was not enough of a demonstration of Arminian folly, a 
demonstration of Arminian logical incoherence would work too. "If the 
will determines itself, then either the will is active in determining its voli-
tions, or it is not," Edwards reasoned. "If it be active in it, then the deter-
mination is an act of the will; and so there is one act of the will determin-
ing another. But if the will is not active in the determination, then how 
does it exercise any liberty in it?" (1:176). 
Perhaps one could simply say that the will operates without causes, but 
Edwards was only waiting to point out that uncaused volitions were 
pretty much the same thing as chaos-and did the Arminians really want 
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to suggest that we lived in a universe of chaos? "If we begin to maintain, 
that things may come into existence, and begin to be, which heretofore 
have not been, of themselves, without any cause; all our ... evidence of 
the beiqg of God, is cut off at one blow" {1:181-83). In that case, pure, 
raw chance would rule our affairs, and chance's rule would be no less ab-
solute than that of God. On the other hand, if the Arminian should 
hastily propose that the will is determined by the intellect, then what has 
the Arminian said 'which differs from Edwards' Calvinism? "If it deter-
mines them by an act of the understanding, or some other power, then the 
will don't determine itself; and so the self-determining power of the will 
is given up" (1:191). In the last ditch, one could do as Dr. Johnson did 
("We know our will is free and there's an end on't") and appeal to the felt 
experience of choosing in spite of the intellect or a motive or a cause as a 
demonstration of the will's freedom. But Edwards would have none of it. 
Such an experience was illusory. It might be possible "for the under-
standing to act in indifference, yet to be sure the will never does; because 
the will's beginning to act as if the very same as its beginning to choose or 
prefer" (1:197). We can fool ourselves into believing that the will can do 
something in spite of what the intellect says, but that will be true only if 
the intellect is viewing the situation "remotely and generally." When you 
actually come to "the last step," the very next thing to be determined "is 
not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about" (1:202). 
Edwards played cat-and-mouse like this with Arminianism all through 
the second "part" of Freedom of the Will. But even Edwards had the sense 
that he was shredding tissue paper rather than attacking the real core of the 
Arminian persuasion, and that was the terror of mechanism and the fear 
that determinism would cooperate with mechanism in tearing away every 
ethical restraint from evil and every moral incentive to good by persuading 
people that their actions were simply what they had to be. So in the third 
"part," Edwards finally settled on the real question underlying the flight to 
free will: is the Arminian notion of free will and self-determination actually 
needed to ensure moral accountability, even if it is logically flawed? Is it re-
ally the case that "such kind of liberty" is "requisite to moral agency, virtue 
and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, etc." {1:277)? 
Edwards replied with a mixture of theological and philosophical ri-
postes. God is good, Edwards asserted, and "not only virtuous, but a 
being in whom is all possible virtue," to the point where he cannot do 
evil. He is,, in other words, "necessarily holy, and his will necessarily de-
termined to that which is good" (1:278). Yet, no one, even Arminians, 
had ever expressed an anxiety that, because God's goodness is necessary, 
it was unworthy of praise or considered as anything less than perfectly 
holy. Why should ours, if it is under God's direction? Likewise, "it was 
impossible, that the acts of the will of the human soul of Christ should, 
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in any instance, degree or circumstances, be other wise than holy" -yet, 
by Arminian logic, that made Christ merely a machine, and completely 
lacking in the freedom necessary to being a genuine moral actor (1:281). 
If necessity was good enough for Jesus Christ, why should those who, 
like the Arminians, claim to be his disciples, complain? 
It was Edwards' delight to remind the Arminian that the purpose of 
moral law was not to create an environment where all were free to create 
their own alternatives but "to bind to one side," to train people's re-
sponses to avoid some actions and do others. Allow the Arminian defini-
tion of free will as "indifference" to stand and we would have to say that 
every law ever passed "destroys liberty; as it puts the will out of equilib-
rium." Wasn't it the most basic "end of commands ... to turn the will 
one way" rather than another, and to cultivate a partiality for doing the 
good, not to encourage it to gallop off madly in all directions (1:304)? 
Ironically, any free-wilier who actually cultivated such an "indifference" 
to having their will caused to do good was performing what any normal 
person would consider the diametric opposite of virtue. "In order to the 
virtuousness of an act," the Arminians must demand that "the heart ... 
be indifferent in the time of performance of that act, and the more indif-
ferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act which is performed, so 
much the better; because the act is performed with so much the greater 
liberty" (1:321). If this is what Arminians believed was the original moral 
position, then no society could entertain much hope for a moral future. 
To say, then, that people possess a moral inability to do good because of 
their vicious habits or temperament gives them no excuse because some-
how they could not cultivate an "indifference" to those habits or tempera-
ments; to the contrary, a moral inability, "consisting in the strength of ... 
evil inclination, is the very thing wherein ... wickedness consists" (1:309). 
Whereas people possessed of moral ability to do good would normally be 
the object of praise--except by Arminians, who would criticize them for 
being machines. Better in this case to be a machine, Edwards drily re-
marked. "Machines are guided by an understanding cause, by the skillful 
hand of the workman or owner," whereas among Arminians, "the will of 
man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingence" 
(1:371). 
If the third "part" of Freedom of the Will was devoted to showing how 
Arminian self-determination did nothing to promote the goal of moral 
accountability, the fourth and last "part" had to bear the burden of 
showing that Calvinism did. And to do that, Edwards needed to call on 
the most important of the terms he had defined in the first "part," neces-
sity. In the Calvinist universe, where God determined all things, every 
human action was consequently necessary. The lexicon of eighteenth-
century philosophy was primed to regard anything which was necessary 
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as lacking in moral content, because there were no real alternatives pos-
sible. But Edwards argued that necessity is not the enemy of virtue. Even if 
virtuous acts proceed from an individual equipped by God with virtuous 
dispositions, that did not destroy the virtue of the act itself. People have 
the notion, Edwards complained, that necessity always means forcible re-
straint or armed compulsion. But he had demonstrated in the first "part" 
that this was a "vulgar sense" of the term, and thata "metaphysical sense" 
was "entirely diverse." And as soon as people thought one step above the 
"vulgar," they would see that "the glorified saints have not their freedom 
at all diminished, in any respect; and that God himself has the highest pos-
sible freedom ... and are so, for that very reason, because they are most 
perfectly necessary." 
If Arminians argued that Calvinism promoted fatalism, they were in-
dulging in a post hoc, propter hodallacy, since there was no inherent ten-
dency within Calvinism to produce,fatalism. If Arminians argued that 
Calvinism made God the "author"' of evil, Edwards replied that they had 
made a category error. God, according to Calvinism, was merely "the 
permitter, or not a hinderer of.sin; and at the same time, a disposer of the 
state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy and most excellent ends 
and purposes" (1:399). And if Arminians argued that Calvinism helped 
to produce atheism, Edwards had no difficulty-based on what had hap-
pened in Northampton-in replying that "their doctrine," not his, "ex-
cuses all evil inclinations, which men find to be natural; because in such 
inclinations, they are not self-determined." It was not among Calvinists 
but among Arminians that the anxiety to get right with the eighteenth-
century haut monde was the more prevalent. Ever since Arminianism had 
become the fashion, "vice, profaneness, luxury and wickedness of all sorts, 
and contempt of religion, and of every kind of seriousness and strictness 
of conversation" have begtm to "proportionably prevail" (1:468). As he 
wrote to John Erskine three years later, 
This doctrine of a self-determining will, as the ground of all morgl good and 
evil, tends to prevent any proper exercise of faith in God and Christ, in the af-
fair of our salvation, as it tends to prevent all dependence upon them. For, in-
stead of this, It teaches a kind of absolute independence in all these things that 
are of chief importance in this,affair; our righteousness, depending originally 
on our own acts, as self-determined. (16:721-22) 
To use a modern classification, Edwards was a compatibilist: liberty and 
necessity are compatible with each other. But all the same, it was a com-
patibilism in which necessity clearly played the dominant role and liberty 
served to explain necessity's operations. Stubborn Arminians would com-
plain, he realized, that any idea of necessity, no matter how cleverly 
phrased or deployed, still reduced people to ,the level of something like 
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machines, and in the process, surrendered theism to the mechanism that 
Enlightenment unbelief at its worst now espoused. 
Freedom of the Will made a greater impact at first in Scotland than in 
New England, where many of its readers, like James Dana of Walling-
ford, found the book simply incomprehensible. That opinion changed 
abruptly after 1765, when Edwards' pupil, Samuel Hopkins, published 
an attack on the New England church establishment, using Edwards' 
doctrine of natural and moral ability to decry compromises New England 
church leaders had made over the decades with the Puritan ideal of a 
holy, gathered church. Freedom of the Will became the touchstone of the 
antiestablishment New Divinity, and the entire free will argument became 
the great issue of New England theology for a century after Edwards' 
death. The book's celebrity eventually pushed it into the main currents of 
American philosophy before the Civil War, and even the Civil War's pres-
ident, Abraham Lincoln, "always hoped to get at President Edwards on 
the Will. "7 
With the waning of the New England Theology in the later 1800s and 
the rise of pragmatism, "Edwards on the Will" dropped back into a 
philosophical limbo. Even sympathetic biographers, like Ola Elizabeth 
Winslow in 1940 and Perry Miller in 1949, found that Freedom of the 
Will's hammerlock obsession with strangling Arminian free-willism fit 
poorly into the new narratives they constructed for Edwards' life and for 
American intellectual history as the story of an es~pe from "the tram-
mels of inability." Winslow conceded that Freedom of the Will was "an 
amazing performance," in which Edwards' "dexterity in accomplishing 
what at times appear to be logical impossibilities is thrilling to watch." 
But in the end, Winslow concluded, that it was a "great polemic" rather 
than a "great book," and "paralyzed debate when debate needed most to 
be stimulated. "8 Miller, likewise, hailed Freedom of the Will as "beyond 
all peradventure ... [Edwards'] most sustained intellectual achievement, 
the most powerful piece of sheer forensic argumentation in American lit-
erature." Even so, for Miller it seemed oddly out of place in a story where 
Edwards figured as a frontier Niebuhr, calling down judgment on proto-
capitalist cupidity. It was not, after all, "so rich or human a book" as Ed-
wards' writings on revival, and his arguments seemed "like a battleship 
wasting broadsides on a flimsy target." 9 
Perhaps because of these discouragements, perhaps because of the dif-
ficulties of tackling so mammoth an eighteenth-century philosophical 
text, Freedom of the Will made only brief appearances in the central texts 
on Edwards' theology and ethics by Conrad Cherry, Clyde Holbrook, 
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and Roland Delattre. The publication in 1957 of Paul Ramsay's edition 
of Freedom of the Will as the first volume of the Yale series of Edwards' 
works was a turning point in the interpretation of the text. (Arthur E. 
Murphy hailed it in a substantial and perceptive review essay in Philo-
sophical Review as "an event of philosophical importance ... not merely 
to early American but to contemporary philosophy. ")1° John E. Smith's 
chapter on Freedom of the Will in Jonathan Edwards: Puritan, Preacher, 
Philosopher (1992) offers one of the most extended rereadings of the 
book in recent times. 
Freedom of the Will still suffers among Edwardsean interpreters in al-
most inverse proportion to its importance in the Edwardsean canon. On 
the other hand, the American philosophical climate has swung since 
World War II substantially back in the direction of various forms of de-
terminism. As in Edwards' day, the most recent forms of determinism 
have been cast into the hardest and most mechanistic patterns, with 
analogies to computers and computation replacing the eighteenth cen-
tury's admiration for orreries and machines, while the most ambitious the-
istic and philosophical resistance to the new mechanism has resorted to 
contingency and process theology (or "openness-of-God"). Perhaps a new 
relevance may yet be found in Edwards' greatest work. 
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